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No Country For Old Cleavages: 
Political attitudes and beliefs amidst  
the Greek debt crisis
Elias Dinas
The Greek youth enters in their formative period amidst a period of  a severe debt crisis that has been having 
unforeseeable implications to the established party system. How do these new political developments affect the 
attitudes, beliefs and the repertoire of  political actions of  this generation? What is the role of  old cleavages and 
traditional division lines in this ever-changing political setting? Drawing on a novel sample from university stu-
dents, the paper assesses the impact of  the crisis on young people’s political beliefs. The findings suggest that the 
classic left-right division is not adequate to represent the much more nuanced and complex divisions generated 
as a result of  the crisis. Some of  the information provided in this survey helps to explore the role of  new seem-
ingly important division lines in helping us understand the dynamics of  party competition and public opinion.
Introduction
In what has probably been one of  the most controversial Academy Award 
winner for Best Picture and Best Director, the Coen Brothers, drawing on 
the notorious novel of  Cormac McCarthy, “shoot” three of  the seemingly 
exemplary archetypes of  the American society: a welder and hunter Vietnam 
veteran in rural Texas, a soon to be retired laconic Sheriff, and a seemingly 
gifted ex-Special Forces officer. Each one of  them faces at some point, the 
“beast”, Anton Chigurh (Javier Bardem), an unemotional killer with a unique 
murder weapon at his disposal. There is no mystery in how the psychopathic 
killer finally wins, apart from the fact that he uses his weapon to dispassion-
ately murder nearly every rival, bystander and even employer in his pursuit of  
his quarry and the money. As the farmer desperately attempts to keep one step 
ahead, the blood from this hunt begins to flow behind him with relentlessly 
growing intensity as Chigurh closes in. In the meantime, the otherwise – but 
not in this move – bound to win in the final scene old Sheriff  (Tommy Lee 
Jones) starts to reflect on how America he was used to, had gradually changed.
Having entered since May 2009 the rescue mechanism, monitored and 
supported by the European Union, the European Central Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the country has been already bailed out twice, con-
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tinuing to face a hardly sustainable debt crisis, accompanied by a seemingly 
endless series of  austerity measures that have been affecting all sectors of  the 
society. “The Beast” this time is simply the sheer financial reality. And, even 
if  slowly, it starts to threaten various long-standing archetypes of  the Greek 
culture (Dinas 2010). For some, these archetypes are all symptoms of  an in-
ward-looking “underdog” culture that can be traced in the process of  national 
integration (Diamantouros 1983). For others, they are simply the product of  a 
Mafia-like constellation of  corporatist interests, coupled by a supportive popu-
list party system (Pappas 2011).
As is often the case, the ever-approaching financial disaster has been ac-
companied by an unprecedented lack of  support for the political system, its 
political and institutional representatives and both EU- and IMF-related ac-
tors. Often in violent forms, this upheaval has been manifested with massive 
riots and rallies in an almost weekly basis. This setting comes in contrast to 
what was often deemed to be a polarized partisan electorate, largely attached 
to one of  the two main political parties that have been holding office since the 
country’s democratic transition in 1974, namely the incumbent Pan-Hellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the right-wing Nea Democratia (New De-
mocracy, ND). In the current setting, in which the average level of  confidence 
to the political parties is 1.6 in a 0 to 10 scale (in 1985 the equivalent figure 
was 6.1), it is interesting to see what has remained from the political lessons 
of  the family. 2009 is not very far from 2004, when the successful hosting of  
the Olympic games in conjunction with other national sport triumphs amidst 
an era of  plasmatic financial prosperity gave room to increased ties with the 
political system and the parties in particular. In less than five years this ideal 
image has been replaced by overwhelming pessimism about the economic and 
political situation in the country, matched with almost unanimous disapproval 
of  the government for the way in which it has been managing the crisis as well 
as all previous governments and leading political and institutional figures for 
their responsibility in bringing the country on the verge of  bankruptcy.
Young cohorts have found themselves at the heart of  these developments. 
Drawing on a sample targeted to university students, the aim of  this paper is 
to explore the impact of  this turbulent period of  political turmoil on young 
people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. To do so, however, it is first essential 
to briefly highlight the political cues disseminated during this period.
The Greek Crisis and the transmission of political attitudes
Although Greek political culture since the mid 1990s has been characterized 
by high levels of  political cynicism (Demertzis and Kafetzis 2006; Nikolako-
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poulos 2005), political views and evaluations about the political parties and the 
political personnel of  the country have worsened dramatically the last years. 
The entrance of  the country in the auspices of  the IMF/ECB/EU mechanism 
in March 2010 marked a period of  continuously escalating public discontent, 
starting at the aftermath of  the 2007 election, and manifesting itself  in a vio-
lent form with the December 2008 riots all over the country. Being the first 
EU-member state that resorts to an IMF loan to avoid official bankruptcy, the 
news of  March 2010 came as the ultimate piece of  evidence suggesting that the 
political and economic elites during the last decades failed to address the long-
term deficiencies of  the country’s economy. Soon after the first bailout package 
was secured, a series of  austerity measures was proposed. During this period, 
two different types of  reactions emerged. On the one hand, public intellectuals 
criticized what they perceived as a long-standing culture of  corruption and cli-
entelism. However, this “looking-at-the-mirror” pseudo-psychoanalytic inspec-
tion to the paradoxes of  the Greek public sector and the Greek socioeconomic 
structure in general failed to dominate the public debate. An aggressive wave 
of  populism, backed up by almost all opposition parties and most of  the me-
dia, deviated the discussion from the origins of  the crisis to the errors made by 
the current government in handling the situation. The result of  this explosive 
blend was that public opinion not only targeted invariably politicians and po-
litical parties within the country but it also channeled its anger abroad, mainly 
focusing on key actors of  the EU, condemning them for their reluctance to help 
the country escape the crisis. In a political environment in which the status of  
the economy monopolized public and media attention for over than a year, 
key players in the negotiation processes, such as Germany and its Chancel-
lor, Angela Merkel, were often portrayed as equally responsible for this freefall 
as Greek political elites. The reproduction of  populist opinion articles, full of  
stereotypes about the “Greek laziness”, coming from German magazines and 
newspapers boosted the stigmatization of  Germany, the EU and the IMF as 
evils trying to take advantage of  the current situation in Greece, mainly by 
aspiring to buy at a low cost many of  the state’s assets. 
The most interesting aspect of  these developments relates to the way in 
which opinions about the Memorandum that was signed between the EU/
IMF, the European Central Bank and Greece cross-cut prior ideological and 
other divisions both at the party level and the level of  the electorate. For the 
left, opposition to the IMF was mainly driven by ideological motivations, since 
the policies advocated by this institution are typically characterized as neo-
liberal. Argentina, for example, having recently passed through the experience 
of  IMF surveillance, has never been referred to so frequently in the news or 
public debates as it has been referred to by the Greek left since 2009. The re-
action from the right was mainly funneled by the perception that this project 
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would fail to provide a long-term viable perspective for the Greek economy. 
For many supporters of  both ideological camps however, important part of  
this discontent stemmed from what they perceived as a wound of  national 
pride: signing the Memorandum was deemed to constitute an act of  national 
betrayal, giving the authority to external actors to rule the economic and po-
litical decisions within the country. Accordingly, for a large part of  the elector-
ate public dissent soon shifted against the incumbent party and its leader and 
Prime Minister George Papandreou.
The overarching character of  dissent was manifested in various instances 
during the last year. Massive rallies, strikes and riots were not new to Greece 
but until now they were mainly directed and largely controlled by trade un-
ions and political parties. In these last months, Greek political elites have 
witnessed a widespread wave of  political expressions of  disobedience. Exam-
ples of  this tendency are two movements, which gradually converged, one 
boycotting the increase of  the ticket price in Athens’ metro and other means 
of  public transport and the other reacting to the imposition of  new tolls in 
national highways. During the same period, politicians from the two major 
parties were harassed or even persecuted by Greek citizens both inside the 
country and abroad. The pick of  this movement took place only recently 
when thousands of  people started gathering every day for more than two 
months in front of  the parliament demonstrating their discontent with the 
political system and aiming to prevent, often by physically threatening them, 
MPs from voting in favor of  the new austerity plan, a precondition for the 
second bail-out that was decided in May 2011. These rallies, initially inspired 
by the Spanish “indignados”, were the first ones that managed to attract so 
many participants without any partisan or other institutional label. Also as a 
consequence of  this, this was a very heterogeneous group, where extreme left 
coexisted with the extreme right on the grounds of  their disapproval towards 
the current political regime. It is for example indicative that by 1994, the 
correlation between left-right self-placement and satisfaction with democracy 
was -.35. In 2009 the equivalent figure was -.03. By the same token, prior 
partisan ties do not help much in the categorization of  different repertoires 
of  reactions against the political system.
In this new political context, where prior partisan identities have waned 
and ties with ideological and political benchmarks have broken, young adults 
are called to form their political opinions and establish their policy and par-
tisan preferences (Stoker and Jennings 2009). It is hard to deny that the pe-
riod in which they enter in their early adulthood bears no resemblance to the 
equivalent formative period experienced by their parents. In a period where 
the political stream changes so radically from one generation to the next, what 
remains from the shadow of  the past in young people’s attitudinal profiles? To 
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what extent are long-established ideological cleavages still useful in absorbing 
the newly emerging division lines?
By delving into the relationship between ideological orientations and at-
titudes towards the crisis and its outcomes, we aim to portray the repertoire of  
reactions against what is perceived as a failing political system. How do citi-
zens react in the light of  recurring signals of  public policy failure? To explore 
this question, it is necessary to delve into the interchange between attitudes 
and beliefs about the new economic and political conditions as the immediate 
aftermath of  the crisis. 
Data and measurement
The data come from a small study implemented in two small Greek universi-
ties (University of  Thrace and University of  Western Macedonia) with random 
selection of  courses (proportional to the number of  registered participants) and 
random selection of  individuals within each course during the exam day of  this 
course in June 2011. Given limitations in the amount of  resources, only 500 in-
dividuals were targeted, resulting in a total number of  approximately 360 cases. 
Needless to say, the small number of  observations and the fact that only two 
universities are examined creates generalizability concerns regarding the find-
ings presented in this study. Although there is not much that can be done to ad-
dress this problem, it is at least somewhat reassuring that marginal distributions 
in various questions of  interest are very similar when compared to equivalent 
distributions of  university students representing a small part of  a nation-wide 
study all over Greece during approximately the same period (April 2011).1
The main variables used in the analysis relate to people’s attitudes towards 
the agreement signed between Greece and the IMF/EU/ECB mechanism, 
what will be referred to as the Memorandum. The memorandum constitutes 
the locus of  hearted discussions both by the media, the parties and public 
opinion and has become the key word summarizing the crisis. It represents the 
series austerity measures taken by the government during the last three years 
1  During the same period, a nation-wide telephone survey with more than 5,000 respondents 
took place with a different research agenda. That said, some questions were common. In total, 
there were 300 students included in this survey. Their average level of  confidence to the parlia-
ment is identical (1.6) to what was found here. The mean score of  sympathy towards PASOK 
and ND were also very similar (1.63 and 1.49 in the telephone survey; 1.64 and 1.55 in this pi-
lot study, all paired sample t-tests easily fail to reject the null of  difference in the means between 
the two surveys. All Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests also suggest that the two pairs of  distributions 
are equally skewed).  
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and serves to depict the new division between those supporting an “exit” solu-
tion and those advocating compliance with the package and the agreements to 
ensure the permanence of  the country within the European Union. In total, 
six measures are used. All of  them are framed by using the typical 1-5 Likert 
scale, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Respondents had 
to indicate their level of  agreement with respect to the following statements: 
“The Memorandum 1) will make things worse; 2) is bad but necessary; 3) will 
aid the country’s economic recovery; 4) was imposed by the EU and Germany 
in particular to serve their own interests; 5) means loss of  sovereignty”; and 
“Other ways to confront the crisis should have been chosen.”
Other items that will be discussed in the next section relate to the at-
tribution of  responsibility for the crisis. A long list of  names was presented, 
including politicians, institutions and other stimuli, both of  national and 
international character. Respondents had to give a score from 1 (not at all 
responsible for the crisis) to 4 (very responsible for the crisis). More details 
about each of  these questions are given in the next section and the accom-
panying figures.
The last party of  the empirical analysis is devoted to the examination 
of  young people’s attitudes towards instances and collective expressions of  
civic disobedience. Given that the questionnaire was administered and that 
the fieldwork period was over before the emergence of  the “Syntagma square-
Indignados” movement, there is no available question for this period. The only 
two available items ask people to give their opinion about the “not-paying” 
movement and the instances of  prosecution of  politicians by citizens either in 
Greece or abroad. Again, two 1-5 agree/disagree scales have been used for 
each of  these two indicators.
Results
Figure 1 presents the mean levels of  anti-memorandum sentiments using the 
survey items described above. Irrespective of  which item is used a common 
picture emerges. The average scores lean clearly towards the anti-memoran-
dum extreme. Interestingly, the item that most unequivocally evokes anti-
memorandum attitudes is the one that asks respondents whether they agree 
with the argument that the bail-our plan was imposed by the European Union 
and Germany in particular in order to serve their interests.
Ever since the country’s democratic transition, the left-right division has 
been an excellent predictor of  partisan attitudes and political preferences (Ka-
lyvas 1998; Moschonas 1995; Nikolakopoulos 2005). How well does knowl-
edge on left-right self  placement help us predict people’s attitudes to this issue? 
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Figure 2 shows the local average score in each item about the memorandum, 
across the LR scale.2 The evidence is quite straightforward. There seems to be 
no association between left-right and people’s views on the bail-out scheme. 
A rather flat pattern is found, revealing hardly any relationship between LR 
and memorandum. In a couple of  cases, a negligible downward trend can be 
discerned, indicating that those located at the left are somewhat more strongly 
opposed to the bail-out package,  is not statistically significant.3
Let us now move to the question about who is to be held responsible for the 
debt crisis. Responses could range between 1 (“Not responsible”) to 4 (“Very 
Responsible”). The list of  items includes various stimuli from both domestic 
and international politics. Various previous Prime Ministers, Greek political 
parties (the two major ones that had been in power since 1974), the previous 
generation as a whole, the immigrants (constituting the second most salient 
debate in Greece  after the crisis), the financial system, Greek banks, Germany, 
2 Dots denote mean scores, spikes indiate the 97% confidence intervals of  these mean estima-
tes, as taken with 1000 bootstrapped samples. Each item ranges from 1 (most pro-Memoran-
dum option) to 5 (most anti-Memorandum option).
3  The only case in which this trend approaches levels of  statistical significance is with the item 
that asks respondents if  they agree that the memorandum is bad but essential. This is the only 
item that does not seem to share significant portion of  its variance with the other items, as 
shown by a factor analytic solution including all these items. 
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and the current German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. Figure 3 sorts all items 
from the lowest (low attribution of  responsibility) to the highest (high attribu-
tion of  responsibility) average scores.4 Quite unexpectedly, average scores are 
high: no item is given an average score less than two and the average value is 
only below 2.5 in the question about immigrants. More importantly, stimuli 
not directly related to the Greek political system (immigrants, banks, Germa-
ny, Merkel) are held less responsible on average than even old politicians who 
once played an important role in the economic and political setting but have 
no active role in Greek politics during the last years. Taking into account that 
for some of  these Prime Ministers were active until the period of  early child-
hood for most of  the respondents, this pattern is telling in that it highlights 
how the crisis has been seen by Greek public opinion. Rather than signaling 
the outcome of  wrong-doing of  the last government, it has evoked a more 
general and encompassing feeling of  malfunctioning of  the Greek political 
system, tracing its roots in the very early years of  the post-transition period. In 
other words, it is hard to deny that at least for the Greek youth, the source of  
4 The solid curves present the local average scores in each of  the items measuring attitudes to-
wards the memorandum, conditional on people’s left-right placement. A local regression curve 
(bandwidth .7) is fitted into the scatterplot between LR and memorandum.
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the problem lies in the structural deficiencies of  the political system, as it was 
formed and developed since 1974 and until today.5
Let us now focus on the possible variation in the way attribution of  responsi-
bility has been expressed by our respondents. Are young people likely to distin-
guish between the two different parties (and their Prime Ministers) or do they 
think they are both responsible for the crisis? Moreover, is there a distinction 
between factors and key players in the post-2009 period and important actors of  
the past? Last but not least, do people distinguish between domestic and interna-
tional factors? Are there, that is, two groups, one priming the role of  domestic ac-
tors, whereas the other attributing more responsibility to non-Greek institutions?6
5 Dots denote the mean level of  responsibility attached to each of  the stimuli mentioned in the 
horizontal axis. Spikes present the 95% bootstrapped standard errors. Some explanations about 
these names: Mitsotakis: leader of  ND and Prime Minister, 1990-1993; Andreas Papandreou: 
Founder and leader of  PASOK, 1974-1996, Prime Minister 1981-1989, 1993-1996; Constan-
tine Karamanlis: Founder and leader of  ND, 1974-1980, Prime Minister (after the transition): 
1974-1980; Costas Karamanlis (nephew of  ND’s founder): Prime Minister with the ND: 2004-
2009; Costas Semites: Prime Minister with PASOK: 1996-2004. G.AP. stands for George An-
drea Papandreou, son of  PASOK’s founder and Prime Minister with the same party 2009-2011.
6 A local regression line is fitted into the scatterplot of  left-right orientations with each of  the 
two factors extracted from the items measuring attribution of  responsibility.























































































To see whether this is the case, all these items are factor analyzed (iterative 
principal factors), trying to explore whether any of  these possible patterns de-
scribed above can be revealed from the data. The findings, not shown to save 
space, indicate that all these items seem to cluster in two latent dimensions (ro-
tated solutions). The first dimension reveals attitudes towards the 2007-2009 
government, New Democracy in general, and most of  the old Prime Minis-
ters. The second latent factor groups responses with regard to current actors 
in the debt crisis, i.e. PASOK, the ex-Prime Minister George Papandreou, the 
immigrants, Germany and Angela Merkel. Attitudes towards financial institu-
tions seem to load poorly in both solutions. Hence, a rather straightforward 
distinction emerges. Responses tend to be divided between those looking at 
the crisis as the outcome of  a long-standing and structural deficiencies of  the 
political system and those attributing more responsibility to current actors re-
lated to the post-2009 period. This is what brings Merkel and Papandreou in 
the same dimension.
Another indication about the transformation of  the current political setting 
as a result of  the crisis is that there seems to be no role in the left right dimen-
sion in this distinction. Figure 4 shows that none of  the two factors seems to 
encompass a left-right division. People’s scores in each of  the two new vari-
ables seem unrelated to their left-right self-placement.7
7 A local regression line is fitted into the scatterplot of  attitudes towards the Memorandum 
(summarized through a  with  left-right orientations and each of  the two factors extracted from 
the items measuring attribution of  responsibility.
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The next task now should be to see whether people’s views on the memo-
randum are in some way related to their opinions about who is to be blamed 
for the crisis. A factor analytic solution easily gives only one factor for all 
the items shown in Figure 1, confirming that all these items capture the 
same underlying dimension, i.e. attitudes towards the bail-out plan. Figure 
5 compares the performance of  the left-right division and the two factors 
described above in helping us predict people’s views about the memoran-
dum. The pattern is quite straightforward. We only find a clear monotonic 
relationship between the second factor, representing attitudes towards the 
current political agents dealing with the crisis, and attitudes towards the 
memorandum. Neither the left-right  self  placement or people’s scores in 
the first factor seem to share variance with the way our young respondents 
perceive the memorandum. 
A last pattern that needs to be highlighted relates to the new expressions of  
political discontent.  Two such instances were mentioned above, namely the 
“I don’t pay” movement with regard to increases in the prices of  the metro in 
Athens and in the tolls of  the national highways, and the incidents of  politi-
cians being persecuted either in Greece or abroad. Let us first see whether 
support for these forms of  protest relates to the classic left-right division. Fig-
ure 6 shows that this is hardly the case and only when it comes to the second 
form of  protest. In general, however, the left-right distinction seems to be of  
little help in our understanding of  the degree of  support for these new forms 
of  political expression.
How do the two latent factors perform in this task? Figure 6 shows the re-
lationship between people’s scores in each of  the two factors (higher values 
denote higher levels of  attribution of  responsibility) and their local average 
levels of  support for the two movements of  political discontent. We com-
bine the two respective items into a common encompassing civic disobedi-
ence scale. What we find is a positive and monotonic relationship between 
Figure 5. Exploring the relationship between attribution of  responsibility, left-right 
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each of  the two factors and this scale.8 There is also a weak negative rela-
tionship between left-right placement but the trend is much more evident 
when using the two latent dimensions described above. When regressing the 
resulting scale of  civic disobedience with all three items presented in the 
horizontal axes of  the graphs shown in Figure 6, we only find a significant 
relationship for the two latent factors measuring responsibility attribution 
to either past or current political actors. Recoding these two factors so that 
they also range from 0 to 10, their OLS coefficients are 08 (.02) and 05 (.02) 
respectively.9 The equivalent figure for left0right is .03 (.02). Once again, 
there seems to be clear evidence that attitudes towards modes of  political 
protest are better explained by new frames, as they are generated as a result 
of  the political crisis.
Conclusion
This research note aimed to demonstrate and highlight an important develop-
ment in Greek political culture, a direct consequence of  the financial crisis. 
Historical examples where crises were followed by recurrent populist waves 
are affluent. Greece was not an exception. The elusiveness of  the rescue plan, 
which has been criticized even by the strongest supporters of  economic re-
forms, reinforces the feeling of  despair. A continuous flow of  political infor-
mation provides endless cues  in what has been a period of  unprecedented 
8 A local regression line is fitted into the scatterplot of  expressions of  civic disobedience with 
left-right orientations and each of  the two factors extracted from the items measuring attribu-
tion of  responsibility.
9  Robust standard errors into parentheses.
Figure 6: Exploring the relationship between attribution of  responsibility, left-right 
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political polarization. Political interest exceeds that of  the early 1980s, which 
was far higher than the European average (Martín 2004). It is in this labyrinth 
of  economic uncertainty and political rage that young people form and crys-
tallize their political views. In front of  these dramatic developments, where 
otherwise pervasive ideological cleavages wax and wane, what should our ex-
pectations be about young people’s predispositions towards the crisis?
Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty framework (1970) seems to be a valid theoreti-
cal tool to address this question in a more systematic way. Following this model, 
future research could draw on a classification of  what constitutes an essentially 
heterogeneous group into three categories: for some young Greeks, attitudinal 
updating in the light of  this new information implies increasing sentiments of  
political apathy. For others, the crisis signals the failure of  the existing party sys-
tem and the need to engage in new forms of  political involvement. Finally, a part 
of  this group sees the country’s entrance in the EU-IMF mechanism of  sup-
port as a loss of  sovereignty, which in turn reinforces latent populist sentiments, 
evolving around what students of  Greek politics call a defensive (or underdog) 
culture. It is probably useful to examine the level of  overlap in this trichotomy , 
as well as its partisan socialization roots. Does it embed more profound dissimi-
larities related to the socialization processes of  the Greek youth? What is the role 
of  parental politicization in the formation of  political preferences and how is 
this inheritance questioned, if  not completely abandoned, in front of  the storm-
ing political and economic developments? How durable can parental  political 
lessons be for a generation that experiences a deadlock of  economic recession 
and skyrocketing unemployment? It seems that one of  the factors to which fu-
ture research should pay pride of  place is the process of  parental transmission of  
political attitudes and beliefs and the role of  parental politicization.
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